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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The Issue of Whether the Court Erred by Failing to Sua Sponte Order a 
Psychological Evaluation is Properly Before the Court 
The state argues that the invited error doctrine bars review of the claim. It contends that 
defense counsel's negative answer to the court's question whether "either party contend[s] there 
should be additional investigation or evaluation of the defendant before sentencing" estops Ms. 
Bolan from contending otherwise now. State's Brief, pg. 5, quoting T pg. 14, In. 5 - pg. 16, In. 9. 
As authority for its contention it cites to State v. Rollins, 152 Idaho 106, 114,266 P.3d 1211, 
1219 (Ct. App. 2011). Rollins, however, is easily distinguishable and does not support the state's 
contention. 
In Rollins: 
The district court inquired about the need for an LC.§ 19-2524(1) evaluation 
which includes "substance abuse assessment and/or mental health examination." 
Rollins' counsel stated that such an evaluation was not necessary, indicating that 
the drug rehabilitation program would provide the necessary evaluation. Any error 
by the district court was, thus, invited by Rollins affirmatively declining an 
evaluation which could have included a mental health examination. The doctrine 
of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or her 
own conduct induces the commission of the error. One may not complain of 
errors one has consented to or acquiesced in. In short, invited errors are not 
reversible. 
152 Idaho at 114 n. 4,266 P.3d at 1219 n. 4 (internal citations omitted). In Rollins defense 
counsel affirmatively told the sentencing court that an evaluation "was not necessary" believing 
there would be an adequate substitute produced at a later time. Here trial counsel simply didn't 
ask for an evaluation. He did not affirmatively ask the Court to commit eITor, rather he merely 
failed to object to error. That is not sufficient to constitute invited eITor. Compare, State v. 
Caudill, I 09 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985) ("In the instant case the prosecution did 
not introduce the extrajudicial statement or elicit the testimony to which Caudill now objects, 
rather Caudill's own counsel elicited the testimony."); compare also State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 
836, 838, 673 P .2d 436, 43 8 (1983) ("In the present case, the State having requested the trial 
court to dismiss the charge has invited the very error of which it now complains.") and State v. 
Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816,821,864 P.2d 654,659 (Ct. App. 1993). (Where, "witness gave an 
accurate, fair and responsive answer to defense counsel's question ... [ d]efense counsel's failure 
to know the answer to the question ... does not excuse the invited nature of the error."). 
This case is more like State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 985 P.2d 117 (1999). There, trial 
counsel concurred in the court's jury instructions, but challenged some of them on appeal. The 
state argued that the jury instruction error was invited by the counsel's concurrence. The 
Supreme Court disagreed, noting that counsel did not invite the court to give the challenged 
instructions. It wrote, "The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who caused 
or played an important role in prompting a trial court to give or not give an instruction from later 
challenging that decision on appeal." 133 Idaho at 246, 985 P.2d at 120. Here, counsel's failure 
to inform the court that he thought a LC. § 19-2522 psychological evaluation should be obtained 
did not invite the court to violate its duty under that statute to obtain one. See also State v. 
Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 477, 272 P.3d 417, 449 (2012), reh'g denied (Feb. 8, 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 141 (2012). ("Thus, we hold that Adamcik is not precluded by the invited 
error doctrine from raising this issue on appeal, as he did not encourage the district court to offer 
the specific malice instrnctions given, but merely failed to object.") 
This case is more like Blake than Rollins. Counsel's failure to request additional testing 
did not encourage the court's actions in any way and the purpose of the invited error doctrine 
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would not be furthered by its application in this case. Consequently, the state's invited error 
argument should be rejected. 
The state also argues that this issue may not be addressed for the first time on appeal 
because it is not fundamental error. State's Brief, pg. 6-8. This, however, is a strawman 
argument because Ms. Bolan does not claim that the fundamental error doctrine applies. Rather, 
she argues that the issue may be reviewed under the State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 366, 195 
P.3d 723, 725 (Ct. App. 2008) "manifest disregard" test. Whether that test or the "fundamental 
error" set forth in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961 (2010), applies here will be 
resolved by the Supreme Court in either State v. Carter, No. 39927 or State v. Clinton, No. 
40461. Time will tell on this issue. 
If the "manifest disregard" test survives Carter/Clinton, Ms. Bolan's case may be 
reviewed under that standard. As previously argued, Dr. DeLawyer's Health and Welfare report 
did not have information satisfying I. C. § 19-2522(3). To this the state notes that the evaluation 
included a "detailed discussion of Bolan's troubled past, analysis of relevant mental health 
concerns, and diagnoses." State's Brief, pg. 9. But that is not adequate. It did not include an 
analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment as required by I. C. § 19-
2522(3)( e ). And it did not consider, as required by subsection (3)(f), the risk of danger which the 
defendant may create for the public if at large. Consequently, the Health and Welfare evaluation 
was inadequate to satisfy the requirements of LC. § 19-2522, because it did not address all the 
statutory factors. The purpose of Dr. DeLawyer' s report was to determine what steps should be 
taken so that Ms. Bolan' s three young children could be safely returned to her home. PSI, pg. 
100. It was not intended to assist the court with its sentencing decision and was not an adequate 
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substitute for an evaluation designed for that purpose. The trial court manifestly disregarded the 
requirements of LC.§ 19-2522 by not ordering an evaluation tailored to the sentencing decision. 
The state concludes its argument on this issue by noting that I.C. § 19-2522 "imposes no 
requirement on the court in weighing these factors." State's Brief, pg. 10. However, that is not 
the case. The statute requires the court to consider all the required parts of the report, listed in 
subsection (3)(a)-(f) of the statute. That is apparent by the text of subsection (6), which states, 
"Nothing in this statute is intended to limit the consideration of other evidence relevant to the 
imposition of sentence." (Emphasis added.) The statute requires the court to give all the 
subsection (3) factors some weight because it imposes a requirement that the report be prepared 
and considered. (The state is certainly not arguing that the sentencing court could satisfy the 
statute by ordering a report to be prepared while announcing it will not read the report.) 
Moreover, I.C. § 19-2523(1) requires the Court to consider some of the topics required to be 
covered in a § 19-2522 report: "[I]f the defendant's mental condition is a significant factor, the 
court shall consider such factors as. . .. ") Here, the court could not consider all of the § 19-2523 
factors because there was no § 19-2522 report. In particular, § 19-2523(2)(e) requires the court 
to consider any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the public, if at large. But the 
court could not do that because Dr. DeLawyer's report did not address "the risk of danger which 
the defendant may create for the public if at large" as required by§ 19-2522(2)(:f). Similarly, § 
l 9-2523(2)(b) requires the court to authorize treatment during the period of confinement or 
probation if it concludes that "[w]ithout treatment, the immediate prognosis is for major distress 
resulting in serious mental or physical deterioration of the defendant." The court could not 
determine whether that was the case here because Dr. DeLawyer's report did not include an 
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analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment as required by I.C. § 19-
2522(3)(e). Thus, the state's argument in this regard is without merit. 
B. The Court Erred by Failing to Consider Christina's Mental Illness 
The state contends that the record shows that "the sentencing court sufficiently considered 
the substance of LC.§ 19-2522(1) in making its sentencing decisions." State's Brief, pg. 12. 
However, what the record really shows is that the court totally failed to take Christina's mental 
health into account at sentencing. It was not mentioned by the court and there is no indication in 
the record that it was considered in setting the six-year sentence. 
To counter the absence of any mention of Ms. Bolan's mental health, the state asserts that 
the court's "silence on the topic speaks to the implicit consensus that mental health concerns 
were not significant given Bolan's substance abuse problems." State's Brief, pg. 13. But that is 
just wishful thinking on the state's part. There was no implicit consensus. First, silence on a 
subject does not necessarily imply a consensus. Second, while Dr. DeLawyer concluded that 
Christina needed to "complete her substance abuse treatment program," he also concluded that 
Christina "requires extensive mental health treatment," including consideration for psychotropic 
medication and psychotherapy to treat her anxiety and depression. PSI, pg. 100. Further the PSI 
writer noted that the main obstacle to a successful probation was Ms. Bolan's "criminal lifestyle" 
precipitated by "a father who did not want her, a mother in prison, and being physically and 
sexually abused while in foster care." PSI, pg. 13. In other words, the presentence investigator 
was of the opinion that the effect of the traumas which resulted in Ms. Bolan's PTSD was the 
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thing most likely to keep her from successfully completing probation. 1 There was no implicit 
consensus that mental health treatment should be secondary to drug treatment. And the state's 
assertion that it "was Bolan's substance abuse, not mental illness, causing her functional 
impairment, affecting her ability to conform her conduct to the law, and creating a risk of danger 
to others" (State's Brief, pg. 13) is not correct because the drug abuse and mental health issues 
are inextricably intertwined. One cannot be addressed without addressing the other. 
Finally, the state argues that State v. Quintana, -Idaho-, -P.3d-, 2013 WL 
2382526 (Ct. App. June 3, 2013), State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,834,264 P.3d 935,941 (2011), 
and State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 50 P.3d 472 (Ct. App. 2002), only require "that the 
sentencing court's consideration of mental health factors be adequate." State's Brief, pg. 14. But 
in all of those cases, the Court also required that the record show the consideration was adequate. 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho at 461, 50 P.3d at 476 ("The record need only show that the court 
adequately considered the substance of the factors in arriving at its sentencing decision."); State 
v. Quintana, 2013 WL 2382526*3 (Idaho Ct. App. June 3, 2013) ("However, the record has to 
show that the court adequately considered the substance of the factors when it imposed the 
sentence."), citing State v. Miller, 151 Idaho at 836,264 P.3d at 943 ("However, the record has to 
show that 'the court adequately considered the substance of the factors' when it imposed the 
sentence.") in turn quoting Strand, supra. And, in all those cases the record did show 
1 The prior experiences which resulted in Ms. Bolan's supposed "criminal lifestyle" are 
the incidents that Dr. DeLawyer said needed to be confronted in therapy, but which the court 
advised Ms. Bolan to stop thinking about. Compare DeLawyer recommendations ("Therapy also 
needs to address her history of trauma."), PSI, pg. l 00, with sentencing comments of court 
("[S]ometimes people forget that when they're looking backwards at their past, they're setting 
themselves up for failure.") T pg. 27, In. 1-7. 
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consideration by the sentencing court. By contrast, the record here does not show the court gave 
any consideration to Ms. Bolan's mental health problems. Thus, the sentence should be vacated. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should vacate the sentence and remand for a 
new sentencing hearing. 
Respectfully submitted this~ay of August, 2013. 
Dennis Benjamin l 
Attorney for Christina Bolan 
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